This paper evaluates the impact of the 1995-1998 Ontario welfare reforms on the consumption among single mothers. Because welfare is a provincial responsibility in Canada, this study is able to consider the effects of the welfare reforms in Ontario, in comparison with other Canadian jurisdictions at the same time. By utilizing a difference in difference design I compare the changes in the consumption levels among Ontario single mothers to changes in the consumption levels among three distinct segments of Canadian population. The comparison with demographically identical groups under different provincial administrations and the implementation of difference in difference propensity score matching estimates sets my approach apart from previous similar work. The results indicate an initial decrease in the relative consumption levels among Ontario single mothers. This negative policy impact is not present in the long-term results.
1.Introduction.
The effects of welfare reforms on living standards are of considerable importance to policy makers and researchers. Major changes to welfare policy have both equity and efficiency consequences. In the second half of the 1990's, Canadians experienced significant changes in the rules governing eligibility for social assistance 1 and in the levels of benefits. Welfare reforms were most extensive in the province of Ontario where they included both the 21% cut in benefit levels and the tightening of the eligibility rules.
The segment of the population that is most dependent on social assistance, and thus most affected by changes to the welfare code, is single mothers. They account for 12% of family heads [Statistics Canada, 1996] and 30% of welfare caseload [National Council of Welfare, 1998 ]. This paper evaluates the impact of the 1995-1998 Ontario welfare reforms on the consumption levels among single mothers.
I expand on the methodology adopted by Meyer and Sullivan [2004] to examine how different measures of consumption vary in response to transfer income shocks. They look at the 1996 Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) reforms in the United
States. They utilize a difference in difference study design similar to that described in the following sections. Using a traditional natural experiment framework, the authors compare the 'before policy' and 'after policy' consumption estimates for US single mothers relative to estimates for childless single women and married couples with children. Partly as a result of the nationwide nature of the US reforms, Meyer and Sullivan did not differentiate between jurisdictions and, as such, did not compare single mothers covered by policy changes to single mothers experiencing policy stability.
Meyer and Sullivan find evidence of a slight relative improvement in the consumption levels among single mothers. Their results should not appear counterintuitive. One could expect that a considerable 'tightening' of the welfare system should have negatively affected the group traditionally dependent on social support.
However, those changes would be fully reflected by a fall in non-measurable utility. The changes in the US welfare code have made the participation in the workforce more attractive relative to social assistance, and thus, through well-understood, labour-leisure, substitution effects have resulted in an increase in average consumption.
I utilize Canadian 1986 -2001 household expenditure surveys and implement a difference in difference experimental design. In it I compare the changes in the consumption levels among Ontario households headed by single mothers to changes in the consumption levels among three distinct family types. These are the Ontario single childless women, Ontario married couples with children, and Quebec and British Columbia single mothers. The first two family types are analogues to those used by Meyer and Sullivan. The ability to use the third family type, and thus to take an advantage of variations in provincial policy, sets my approach apart from their study. The suitability of each of these groups for the purpose of control in the natural experiment is discussed in the following section.
Recent related Canadian literature evaluates welfare reforms from the perspective of welfare take-up, spell-duration and welfare-to-work related questions [Beaulieu et al 2005 , Lemieux and Milligan 2004 , Milligan and Stabile 2004 , Fortin et al 2004 , Green and Warburton 2004 , Roy 2004 , Sceviour and Finnie 2004 , Dooley et al 2000 . To my knowledge this study represents a first attempt to move beyond those issues and to evaluate the effects of Canadian welfare reforms by focusing directly on household consumption.
Total family consumption is a useful indicator of economic well-being. While exact data on consumption is seldom available, it has become standard practice to use estimates of the family budget constraint or total family expenditure. I use reported estimates of individual family total expenditure as proxy measures for consumption, as did Meyer and Sullivan [2004] . As an alternative measure of consumption I also use net income after taxes 2 , I find that when total expenditure or total after tax family income are used as measures of family consumption, there is considerable evidence of a temporary fall in the relative consumption levels among Ontario single mothers. I also find evidence of no long-term policy effects. This lack of long-term consequences suggests a subsequent recovery from the initial drop. When Quebec and B.C. single mothers are used for comparison the results are most consistent across various methods and specifications. These results also indicate significant between period variation in consumption levels among single mothers.
The remainder of the paper is composed as follows: Section 2 provides an outline of the relevant policy reforms; Section 3 describes the data and the sample selection methods; Section 4 outlines the methodology; Section 5 discusses the key results; Section 6 concludes.
2 Additionally in the appendix available online, I explore several components of the budget constraint. These are social transfer family income, wage income and change in assets.
Outline of the 1995-1998 policy changes: provincial Welfare Reforms and the introduction of the National Child Benefit program.
Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia are the three most populous Canadian provinces, and together they include about three out of four Canadians. The majority of
Canadian single mothers and Canadian welfare recipients also inhabit these provinces.
The relative stability of Quebec and British Columbia welfare laws, during the 1995-1998 period allows for (at least partial) detection of Ontario specific outcomes in relation to nation-wide trends.
The years from 1995 to 1998 were marked by considerable reductions in the number of welfare recipients within each of the provinces under consideration. Table 1 illustrates this decline. According to the Canadian Council of Social Development [1995, 1998 ], the number of Ontario welfare recipients decreased by 19% during this period.
The proportional fall in British Columbia was 21%, while the fall in Quebec was only 10%.
A difference in difference experimental design allows for observing the magnitude of the relative changes in the dependent variable without fully understanding the causality behind those changes. However, in order to interpret the relationships implied by the observed results, one needs to possess a basic understanding of the policy changes underlying the experiment. Both federal and provincial governments initiated these changes. The relevant reforms can be grouped into (i) welfare system related reforms and
(ii) National Child Benefit related reforms. Welfare program reforms were provincial initiatives and were typically designed to make dependence on social assistance less attractive in relation to paid employment. The National Child Benefit (NCB) was a joint federal-provincial program that offered new subsidies to low-income families with children and, in most provinces, also made participation in the workforce more attractive relative to welfare. What follows is a brief description of these policy changes indicating how they provide a suitable natural experiment.
Welfare Reforms in Ontario, Quebec and B.C.:
Ontario enacted the most extensive welfare reforms of all Canadian provinces in the 1990's. In 1995, welfare benefit levels were cut by 21 percent 3 . The Ontario Works
Act was passed in 1996 and implemented in 1998. 4 Ontario Works was implemented gradually, but the objective of the program remained constant. Its overriding focus is to redirect people from permanent dependence on welfare towards the shortest route to full employment. Regulations regarding eligibility for benefits were changed in order to make dependence on welfare less attractive relatively to paid employment. Couples living in common-law relationships were no longer able to claim sole support for the purpose of increased eligibility. Participation in academic upgrading, retraining and job-search related activities, was no longer an option but a requirement for welfare eligibility. The grounds for exemptions from participation in the above activities were also increasingly restricted during the implementation period. 5 When Ontario Works was fully implemented, the only groups permanently exempted from participation were seniors and 3 Even after cuts the benefit levels remained the highest of all Canadian provinces when not adjusted for province specific cost of living. In 1998, single mothers lost their previously automatically awarded exemption from participation in job search or training. In order to remain eligible for benefits, they
too were required to demonstrate their efforts to move to paid employment. We can therefore divide the years under consideration into two separate policy periods: (i) the early (pre 1998) reform period of benefit cuts, initial reforms and exemptions, and (ii) the late (post 1998) reform, period after all the reforms had been implemented and exemptions tightened.
By comparison to Ontario, the province of Quebec experienced only minor reforms to welfare policy during the 1995-98 period. The policies adopted in Quebec emphasized transition to employment by gradual rather than by fastest possible means.
The transition was to be achieved through training and skill improving programs. Benefit levels were not reduced and paid employment was to become more attractive to welfare recipients by means of improvements to the situation of low-income workers. Further changes, legislated in 1999 and after, proceeded in an unchanged spirit: the number of services offered seemed to increase steadily but participation in these programs was not a mandatory requirement for eligibility for social support. [The National Study of Welfare to Work Programs, Phase 1 and Phase 2, Quebec]
British Columbia also adopted a series of welfare reforms during the second half of the 1990s. In 1996: the BC Benefits (Youth Works) Act and the BC Benefits (Income 6 Temporary exemptions (typically of three month duration) could be granted only on the following grounds (i) having a temporary medical condition, (ii) lacking of an appropriate daycare, (iii) caring for the disabled, (iv) caring for family members suffering from a documented medical condition, (v) caring for seniors with documented special needs, (vi) requiring pregnancy/parental leave and (vii) being a single parent caring for a pre-school age child.
Assistance) Act were passed. The first of the acts was aimed specifically at the reduction of unemployment among youth (age 19-24) . According to its provisions, young adults unable to support themselves were eligible for social assistance under conditions similar to those adopted by Ontario for most welfare recipients. In B.C. these young welfare recipients had to actively seek employment and to participate in job training. In return they were offered an allowance and priority placement both in skills training programs The National Child Benefit (NCB) is a joint federal-provincial program designed to provide financial aid to children of lower-income families. NCB went into effect in 1998. In Ontario, B.C. and in a number of other provinces the program encourages working families to remain in the workforce [Milligan and Stabile 2004] . In these provinces benefits provided by NCB are not available to welfare recipients and thus they provide an additional incentive for continued participation in paid employment. In
Ontario provincial social assistance benefit levels were reduced by the amount provided federally under the NCB program. These "saved" provincial funds are then redirected towards investments designed to improve the well-being of low-income children. In July The Quebec government has not officially joined the NCB initiative. Quebec families receive federal NCB transfers that are not integrated with the provincial system and are not contingent on entering or continuing employment [Milligan and Stabile 2004] . Further, in 1997 the province of Quebec introduced, the well-publicized, fivedollars-per-day childcare program that provides universally subsidized childcare to Quebec families. 8 The eligibility for this subsidy is not contingent upon labor force participation.
8 This program has limited average impact on the standards of living among single mother households. As outlined by Lefebvre [2004] the majority of Quebec children registered in subsidized childcare are those from higher income families (with incomes above $40 000). Single mother households typically fall into lower income brackets and are consistently underrepresented among those enrolled in the program. Baker et al [2005] further explain that lower income Quebec families are eligible for a significant childcare subsidy that they have to forgo in order to be eligible for the $5/day childcare. For families with incomes $20 000 the value of this subsidy exceeds the value of the subsidy under the $5/day alternative.
Control Group Suitability.
The Ontario welfare reforms and the National Child Benefit initiative should have similar consequences for single mothers -the attractiveness of paid employment relative to welfare should have increased as a result of both reforms. Lemieux and Milligan [2004] The partial treatments affecting the control groups are not equally shared across all three groups. Quebec and B.C. single mothers are immune to Ontario specific effects.
Similarly, any province specific trends present in Quebec and B.C. will be absent in
Ontario. Due to low intensity of welfare dependence of Ontario control groups, they are much less likely to be affected by the changes to welfare code than the single mothers.
Similarly 
Data.
The data for this paper come from the Canadian Family Expenditure Survey (FAMEX) and its subsequent replacement, the Survey of Household Spending (SHS).
Both surveys are based on the same Statistics Canada labor force sampling frame and use the same weighting system. They cover the same population and the same geographic areas. Finally, both surveys include a number of identically or nearly identically defined variables. As such, merging the surveys for our purposes is a relatively straightforward matter. Period two, the early reform period, refers to the years 1996, 1997 and 1998, the first years after the welfare cuts. These years include the period of gradual implementation of Ontario Works, the narrowing of exemptions from participation in job search and training related -activities, and the introduction of the National Child Benefit. 10 For more details consult Statistics Canada. (2000) The 1996 survey is the final FAMEX survey and the following two are the first SHS surveys.
The final period, the late reform period, includes all available SHS data after 1998: i.e. the 1999, 2000 and 2001 surveys. It covers the time period when all the Ontario welfare reforms were fully implemented. This division into three time periods makes it possible to construct a two stage difference in difference experimental framework in which the immediate transition effects of policy (early reform period) are isolated from the effects after adjustment (late reform period).
The estimated sample was selected using the following guidelines. With the exception of the 1996 survey, only households headed by persons of age 18 to 64 were included. The demographic information in the 1996 survey is inconsistent with the rest of the surveys. For that year only, households headed by individuals who were 16 or 17 years of age were included. Also, in order to maintain continuity of age definitions between the FAMEX and SHS surveys, all reported age answers were bottom-coded at 25.
The treatment and control groups were selected as follows: single mother households, for both treatment (Ontario) and control (Quebec and B.C.) groups, were defined as those headed by a non-married female age 18-64, including no other persons of age 18-64, at least one child of age 15 or younger, and no persons of age 65 and over.
Married couples with children were defined as two opposite sex, married people age 18-64, at least one child of age 15 or younger, and no persons of age 65 and over. The selection of single women living alone was a trivial process.
The above specification criteria for sample selection are not ideal, and are dictated by the demographic information available. One shortcoming is that only those single mothers who were living in households with no other adults are included. Fortunately, as Dooley [1999] points out, close to 90% of Canadian single mothers with young children reside in single adult households. I was also not able to exclude students, whose consumption levels can be interpreted as a consequence of their investment strategy and, as such, do not make suitable control groups. These shortcomings have potential consequences for interpreting labor supply decisions or for interpreting relative magnitudes of various budget constraint components.
Methodology:
The results discussed in the next section were produced in three stages. First, 'raw' difference in difference estimates were created by a way of simple comparisons of the means within the traditional 'before/after treatment/control' four-cell framework.
Second, I followed the methodology adopted by Meyer and Sullivan [2004] and introduced additional information using regression adjusted difference in difference analysis. The incorporation of the demographic details allows separating the mean changes in consumption resulting from policy effects from those resulting from the changes in the characteristics of Ontario single mothers and the relevant control groups.
Third, I applied propensity score matching adjusted difference in difference methodology to further account for differences between treatment and control groups. Meyer and Sullivan point out that expenditure is typically a more reliable measure of consumption (and hence a better indicator of the material standard of living) than income is. I have therefore constructed a measure of total expenditures on all goods and services that cannot be considered investments. I use the sum of expenditures on a series of composite commodities. The composite commodities included in this measure are food purchased from stores, food purchased at restaurants, shelter, household operation, furnishings, car purchase, gasoline, car operation, public transit, personal care services and supplies, alcohol and tobacco, recreation and clothing. I have also used after-tax income as another consumption measure.
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The 1992-base Consumer Price Index (CPI) has been used to deflate all expenditure and income measures. Alternatives to the national CPI include a budget-11 Similarly Meyer and Sullivan [2004] have also found that the choice of the equivalence scale was of minor consequence. 12 Attempts to use the following three components of budget constraint: (i) government transfer income, (ii) wage income, and (iii) yearly change in assets, as dependent variables are not presented here but are discussed in the appendix that is available from the author.
share-weighted mean of several commodity-specific price indexes, and province-specific deflators. Sensitivity tests revealed no significant differences across these alternative specifications of the deflator. 
where SM is a single mother dummy and SMdper is the is the single mother time period interaction term.
The effects of the experiment are the coefficients on dOntariodper or on SMdper (the treatment group-time period interaction terms) that capture the difference in 13 There are two time period dummies. The first is set equal to 1 for observations recoded during the early reform and 0 otherwise and the second is set equal to 1 for observations recoded during the late reform period and 0 otherwise. The pre-reform period is set as base. 14 Unfortunately, the only three demographic characteristics that could be successfully traced across all the survey years are the household size, the age of head of household and the dummy variable set to 1 for observations recorded in cities above 100 000 residents. The lack of any education level related variables within the Survey of Household Spending precluded the option of focusing on low educated single mothers (like Meyer and Sullivan 2004) .
difference policy effects on the Ontario single mothers. The treatment group dummy accounts for the effect of being an Ontario single mother on the predicted consumption levels of households. The time period dummies account for the general time trend effects, and the pre-policy period is set as base. The interaction terms capture the effects specific to single mothers in respective time periods, and, as such, account for the differences in the predicted consumption levels between Ontario single mothers and either of the control groups in each of the two policy time periods.
I use one control group at a time and drop the other control groups out of the estimation. Alternative geographic specifications for equation (1) were used, as were control groups made up exclusively of Quebec single mothers, or exclusively of B.C single mothers. The sensitivity of equation (1) results to using either of these provinces alone is marginal 15 .
The transformation chosen for the dependent variable is
which is the inverse hyperbolic sine proposed by Burbidge et al (1988) . θ is a parameter set equal to one (as in Browning and Crossley 2004) and c is the measure of consumption. This transformation handles large positive values in a manner similar to logarithms, but, unlike logs, it allows for admitting non-positive values.
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After the 'raw' and regression adjusted approaches, the third type of analysis is propensity score matching adjusted difference in difference. Matching estimators assign 15 Similarly, if equation 1 is estimated using all of Canada's non-Ontario single mothers as controls, the general conclusion of the difference in difference results holds across all specifications. What seems to vary is the level of significance. 16 This property is especially practical when the components of the budget constraint such as the government transfer income, the wage income, or the yearly change in assets and liabilities are used. These, measures are positive for only a fraction of a population and, as such, could not be properly accounted for in a traditional log linear framework. These results are discussed in the, available online, appendix. For net income and expenditure regressions which transform always positive dependent variable the results from regressions using inverse hyperbolic sine of the dependent variable produce marginal effects nearly identical to their log linear alternatives. each member of the treatment group to a member(s) in the control group who exhibits similar observable characteristics. Conditional on those characteristics, potential experimental outcomes are assumed independent of treatment or control group membership. Only those members of the treatment group and the control group for whom a suitable match can be found are included in the analysis. In other words, matching adjusted difference in difference estimators compare the before and after differences between treatment and control groups only over the so-called common support range.
17
The larger the number of the characteristics that determine the common support, the more complex and computationally intensive is the resulting matching process.
Fortunately, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) prove that matching can be obtained by pairing treatment and control subjects according to their propensity scores obtained from a parametric model that estimates the conditional probability of belonging to an experimental treatment group. Logistic regression is used for this purpose.
Matching routines implemented for this paper are conducted as follows. First, propensity scores from a logistic regression on participation within the program (i.e. on being an Ontario single mother) are obtained. Those regressions utilize the same demographic characteristics as the regressions in stage two of the analysis. In each case Ontario single mothers are matched to members of one control group while the other two control groups are dropped from the analysis. Second, I perform the matching using the psmatch2 STATA procedure developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003 Tables 2 and 3 offer an overview of the data. Table 2 provides sample sizes, represented population sizes, and per capita weighted means of various components of the budget constraint. Table 3 Most of the survey respondents reported changes in assets and liabilities, but on average these were small relative to other measures. The data do imply however that
Ontario single mothers tend to dissave between $300 to $700 more than Quebec and B.C.
single mothers in almost every surveyed year, but there does not appear to be any correlation between policy timing and the magnitude of these asset changes. 
Regression adjusted difference in difference results
Two regressions were run in order to further investigate the relative changes in the consumption levels of Ontario single mothers. Tables 6 and 7 describe the results of two sets of regressions. Table 6 uses total per capita family net income as a dependent variable. Table 7 uses, per capita total expenditure measure. The early reform period is associated with a statistically significant fall in the relative consumption levels among Ontario single mothers. The magnitude of this relative decrease ranges from five up to fifteen percent depending on the control group chosen. In the first policy period the consumption levels among Ontario single mothers fell by a nearly equal magnitude relative to Ontario married couples with children and to single mothers in Quebec and B.C. This result is difficult to reconcile with what could be expected as a likely policy implication. It should be expected that the consumption levels of groups adversely affected by the policy changes fell the most relative to those who were unaffected.
Contrary to this logic, it appears that despite the tightening of the welfare system, the consumption levels among Ontario single mothers fell by similar amounts relative to single mothers outside of Ontario (unaffected by a policy change), as they fell relative to a control group that was affected the most. Thus, the consumption levels among Ontario single mothers fell the most relative to those who, because of their reliance on transfer income, in all likelihood would be the ones most negatively affected by the policy change.
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The late reform period results suggest an improvement in comparison with the implementation period. Unlike the early policy results, none of the late policy results are statistically significant at 5% level. Only the results relative to married couples with children are almost significant at 10% level. This lack of significance implies no strong long-term policy effect. Apart for their low significance the results suggest that in the late reform period the consumption levels among Ontario single mothers had actually risen relative to Ontario childless single women. The magnitude of the increase is between three and a half and eight percent. Relative to other control groups, the Ontario single mothers' consumption levels increased following the early reform period but 22 A possible explanation for this puzzle is that married couples consist of two individuals who can adjust their employment decisions and that these families are more flexible in their reactions to policy changes than single adult households. Alternatively it could be the case that men in the married couple families face different labor market conditions. nevertheless remained lower than the pre reform estimates. Relative to Married couples with children, the post policy decrease in consumption levels fluctuate around seven percent.
The marginal effects of the time period treatment interaction dummy variable that summarizes the difference in difference component of the regression results are presented in The final set of results has been obtained through the implementation of the propensity score matching adjusted difference in difference techniques. As described in the methodology section, subjects within the treatment group were matched to a weighted average of subjects in the control group. The matching was done based on a number of observable characteristics. The variables used to determine propensity scores were age, household size, and a dummy variable for and urban area of residence. In each period, observations in the treatment group were matched to observations in one of the control groups. The average difference in consumption during each period was then calculated.
Finally, in order to obtain difference in difference results, the average mean difference during the base period was subtracted from the average mean differences in each of the policy periods. Matching was done over a determined common support range and, therefore, excluded those subjects for whom no suitable match could be found.
23 Table 9 contains the results of the matched difference in difference experiment.
The early reform fall in the total expenditure relative to Quebec and B.C. single mothers is now only 1102 dollars and the fall in net income is 959 dollars. These declines are similar to those for the 'raw' and regression adjusted difference in difference estimates in tables 5 and 8. The results for the late reform period indicate that the consumption levels among Ontario single mothers have improved by more than can be suggested by regression adjusted procedures. An decrease of just 90 dollars of income and 117 dollars of total expenditure is noted relative to single mothers in Quebec and B.C. The strength of this conclusion however is undermined by low significance of the late reform period matched results. Another way to interpret this result is to argue that the low significance 23 In each case presented more the 95% of observations were included in the analysis.
of the late reform estimates indicates no long-term policy effects regardless of their magnitude. Arguably this conclusion holds for each control group and across either measure of consumption.
Conclusions.
This paper looks at the effects of a series of 1995-1998 Ontario welfare reforms on consumption levels among the province's single mothers. I merge several Canadian
Family Expenditure Surveys and Surveys of Household Spending. I use net income and total expenditure as measures of household consumption. Based on available data I divide the timeframe into three periods: the pre reform period (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) , the early reform period (1996) (1997) (1998) , and the late reform period (1998) (1999) (2000) . A two stage difference in difference design is used to evaluate the relative changes in the consumption levels among Ontario single mothers. I compare these treatment group changes to changes in the consumption levels among three different control groups, namely single mothers in Quebec and B.C., single childless women in Ontario and married couples with children in
Ontario. The natural experiment is set during the era of widespread welfare reforms in Canada. Consequently, the counterfactual for the experiment is that of less extensive policy changes rather than of absolute policy stability.
I provide three sets of difference in difference estimates. First, I look at changes in mean differences in reported incomes and expenditures. Second, I provide regression adjusted difference in difference results. Finally, I use propensity score matching difference in difference estimators in order to eliminate possible sources of bias, resulting from comparing groups with potentially different average characteristics. Table 10 summarizes the key results discussed in the preceding section. I find that the early reform period had significant negative effects on the consumption levels among Ontario single mothers. Those effects were negative relative to all control groups and remained so across all the difference in difference specifications. This initial impact To my knowledge, the use of control groups from different jurisdictions and the utilization of matching estimators differentiate my approach from previous related work.
As shown, I find that both innovations add potential new information on the overall effect of the welfare reform. Table 2 . Group sample sizes, population represented, mean components of budget constraint and mean total expenditure, by year of survey. Table 2 . Cts. Group sample sizes, population represented, mean components of budget constraint and mean total expenditure, by year of survey. 1982, 1986, 1992 base 1982, 1986, 1992 base Each number represents a change in average differences between the treatment group and the control groups. For example: relative to Quebec and B.C. single mothers the average net income of Ontario single mothers fell by 1373 dollars between the pre reform period and the early reform period. ** indicates a marginal effect, when the difference in difference coefficient is significant at 5% level * indicates a marginal effect, when the difference in difference coefficient is significant 10% level The first columns under net income and total expenditure respectively describe the average difference between the treatment and the relevant control groups within each period. For example: during the late policy period Ontario single mothers on average reported net incomes 533 dollars higher than Quebec and B.C. single mothers. The second columns under net income and total expenditure summarize the average difference in difference result. For example: relative to Quebec and B.C. single mothers the average net income of Ontario single mothers decreased by 90 dollars between the pre reform period and the late reform period. ** significant at 5% level * significant at 10% level at their respective means. This finding is potentially important given the previously suggested trend of a proportion of Ontario single mothers dropping out of the labor force in response to the early reforms and returning only during the late reform period. This result, combined with information from the tables 2 and 3 in the main body of the paper,
indicates that the relative fall in the early reform period in the Ontario single mother consumption levels was more severe among those whose major source of income was wages and not social transfers.
Tables A6 and A7 summarize regression output when per capita expenditure on durables and on necessities respectively are used as the dependent variable. Similarly to Browning and Crossley (2004) , I find that expenditure on durables 25 decreased more 24 200 repetitions each. 25 Durables are defined as the sum of expenditures on furnishings, car purchases and clothing.
significantly than the overall expenditure in response to the negative income shock. Table   A6 shows that during the early reform period, relative expenditure on durables decreased by 26 to 50 percent depending on the control group. These numbers are significantly larger than those reported for total expenditure. In times of negative financial shock, Ontario single mothers responded with delaying the purchases of goods that were not of immediate need. This hypothesis is further reinforced by the results indicated in table A7.
A regression on necessities 26 reveals that the relative household response was much lower, and that there was no long term policy effect. 26 Necessities are defined as the sum of food at home, household operation and clothing Table A4 . Bootstrapped Quintile regression, 25% percentile of income, 200 repetitions.
Will be made available on internet. 
